Affective Phenomenology
12 June 2019
12:00-12:45
Kevin Reuter (Bern)
Title: Distinguishing the phenomenal from the intentional: An empirical investigation into the folk concept of emotion
12:45-13:15
Q&A
13:15-14:00
Catered Lunch
14:00-14:45
Luca Barlassina (Sheffield)
Title: Beyond good and bad: Reflexive imperativism, not evaluativism, explains valence
14:45-15:15
Q&A
Kevin Reuter (Bern)
Title: Distinguishing the phenomenal from the intentional: An empirical investigation into the folk concept of emotion
12:45-13:15
Q&A
13:15-14:00
Catered Lunch
14:00-14:45
Luca Barlassina (Sheffield)
Title: Beyond good and bad: Reflexive imperativism, not evaluativism, explains valence
14:45-15:15
Q&A
Kevin's abstract: Typical emotions seem to have two core features: they feel a certain way and they are intentional. While most emotion researchers believe that typical emotions are both phenomenal and intentional, they also share another crucial assumption, which I will call the assumption of conceptual limitation: Emotion concepts are not sufficiently fine-grained to distinguish the phenomenal from the intentional aspects of emotions. This latter assumption plays a crucial role in the ongoing debate between cognitivists and feeling theorists. In this talk, I will challenge the conceptual limitation assumption about emotions, and provide empirical support for the claim that it is fundamentally mistaken.
Luca's abstract: Evaluativism (Carruthers 2018) and reflexive imperativism (Barlassina and Hayward forthcoming) agree that valence—the (un)pleasantness of experiences—is a natural kind shared across all affective states. But they disagree about what valence is. For evaluativism, an experience is pleasant/unpleasant in virtue of representing its wordly object as good/bad; for reflexive imperativism, an experience is pleasant/unpleasant in virtue of commanding its subject to get more/less of itself. I argue that reflexive imperativism is superior to evaluativism according to Carruthers’s own standards. He maintains that a theory of valence should account for its phenomenology and role in decision-making. I show that it is reflexive imperativism, rather than evaluativism, that fits this explanatory bill.
Luca's abstract: Evaluativism (Carruthers 2018) and reflexive imperativism (Barlassina and Hayward forthcoming) agree that valence—the (un)pleasantness of experiences—is a natural kind shared across all affective states. But they disagree about what valence is. For evaluativism, an experience is pleasant/unpleasant in virtue of representing its wordly object as good/bad; for reflexive imperativism, an experience is pleasant/unpleasant in virtue of commanding its subject to get more/less of itself. I argue that reflexive imperativism is superior to evaluativism according to Carruthers’s own standards. He maintains that a theory of valence should account for its phenomenology and role in decision-making. I show that it is reflexive imperativism, rather than evaluativism, that fits this explanatory bill.
Registration: Please register here.
Venue: Humanities Research Institute, Conference Room. Use the 34 Gell Street entrance.
The Humanities Research Institute is two minutes walk from The University of Sheffield tram stop on the corner of Gell Street and Leavygreave Road. The area is well served by buses from the train station and city centre. There are bicycle stands for cyclists at the front of the building. The building is wheelchair accessible from the back (entry on 34 Gell Street). More information about the venue can be found here.
Venue: Humanities Research Institute, Conference Room. Use the 34 Gell Street entrance.
The Humanities Research Institute is two minutes walk from The University of Sheffield tram stop on the corner of Gell Street and Leavygreave Road. The area is well served by buses from the train station and city centre. There are bicycle stands for cyclists at the front of the building. The building is wheelchair accessible from the back (entry on 34 Gell Street). More information about the venue can be found here.